This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tari¤s and may charge di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a pro…table way. If the incumbent bene…ts from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant bene…ts from customer activism, then foreclosure is pro…table only when switching costs are large enough.
Introduction
Telecommunication networks need access to rivals' customers in order to provide universal connectivity. This need for interconnection requires cooperation among network operators, who must agree on access conditions and, in particular, on termination charges (also called access charges). These wholesale arrangements a¤ect the operators'cost of o¤-net calls and the revenues accruing from providing termination services, and thus have an impact on retail competition among the operators. This raises two concerns. The …rst is that cooperation over interconnection may be used to soften downstream competition; the second is that established network operators may use access charges to foreclose the market.
The former issue was …rst addressed by Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) , who show that high access charges indeed undermine retail competition when networks compete in linear prices and do not price discriminate on the basis of where the call terminates. 1 La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show however that access charges lose their collusive power when networks compete in other dimensions, as is the case of two-part tari¤s, due to a waterbed e¤ect. 2 An increase in the access charge in ‡ates usage prices, but this makes it more attractive to build market share, which results in …ercer competition for subscribers and lower …xed fees: networks can actually …nd it worthwhile to spend the full revenue from interconnection fees to build market share, so that termination charges no longer a¤ect equilibrium pro…ts. This pro…t-neutrality result has since been further studied and shown to depend on three assumptions: full participation, no termination-based price discrimination and network symmetry. 3 López (2008) moreover extends the previous static analyses and shows that, in a two-stage model, even symmetric networks with full consumer participation can use (future) reciprocal access charges to soften competition. 4 In the case of termination-based price discrimination, Gans and King (2001) , building on La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), show that a (reciprocal) access charge below cost reduces competition. The intuition is that o¤-net calls being then cheaper than on-net calls, customers favour smaller networks; as a result, networks bid less aggressively for market share, which raises the equilibrium pro…ts. However, in practice regulators are usually concerned that access charges are too high rather than too low, particularly for mobile operators. As stressed by Armstrong and Wright (2009) , this may stem from the fact that "wholesale arbitrage"limits mobile operators'ability to maintain high …xed-tomobile (FTM) charges 5 alongside low mobile-to-mobile (MTM) charges, since …xed-line networks could "transit"their calls via another mobile operator in order to bene…t from a lower MTM charge. 6 Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010), Hoernig, Inderst and
Valletti (2010), and Hurkens and López (2011) provide alternative explanations for why …rms may prefer above-cost access charges.
The second traditional concern is that cooperation might be insu¢ cient. This issue usually arises in markets where large incumbent operators face competition from smaller rivals, and may be tempted to degrade connectivity or use access charges to foreclose the market. Indeed, small mobile operators often complain that a high termination charge hurts their ability to compete in an e¤ective way with large networks. Two arguments are normally used to motivate this concern. The …rst is a supply-side argument, whereby small operators face higher long-run incremental costs than larger operators due to scale economies. 7 European national regulatory agencies (NRAs) have for example relied on this argument to justify the adoption of asymmetric termination rates.
8 5 Historically, …xed and mobile operators were not really competing against each other, and thus a traditional "one-way access" analysis applied. Termination charges between those two types of networks are moreover usually asymmetric, di¤erent termination costs and regulatory constraints leading to relatively low charges for mobile-to-…xed calls and substantially higher charges for …xed-to-mobile calls. 6 If mobile operators must adopt the same termination charge for FTM and MTM calls, this uniform charge may then be above cost if the waterbed e¤ect on FTM is limited or if operators set their own charges unilaterally. 7 It is also argued that cost di¤erences may be exacerbated by staggered entry dates, unequal access to spectrum and (lack of) integration between …xed and mobile services. 8 See also the review of mobile call termination by the regulator and competition authority for in usage prices, but can moreover charge di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls. Such on-net pricing creates price-mediated network e¤ects and, as a result, the incumbent operator can indeed keep the entrant out of the market and still charge monopoly prices by setting a large enough mark-up (or subsidy) on the access charge, even if access charges are reciprocal. If the incumbent operator bene…ts from "customer inertia", 13 then it has actually an incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access mark-up, so as to foreclose the market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power. Customer inertia thus provides a form of "virtual" switching costs which, combined with high termination charges, is a good substitute for "real" switching costs: in the presence of customer inertia, the incumbent operator can corner the market and earn the monopoly pro…t even in the absence of any real switching costs. A second …nding is that a large termination subsidy may also yield the same outcome; this means that in some cases "bill and keep" may allow the incumbent operator to foreclose the market; however feasibility constraints may limit subsidies, which may moreover trigger various types of arbitrage. The scope for foreclosure is more limited when the entrant bene…ts from "customer activism"; 14 while the incumbent operator may still try to prevent entry, too high an access charge would allow the entrant to overtake it. The incumbent operator may then prefer to set an above-or below-cost access charge, and foreclosure strategies are pro…table only when switching costs are su¢ ciently large.
Our analysis also extends the insight of Gans and King (2001) and shows that, as long as the two networks share the market, a small access subsidy generates higher equilibrium pro…ts (for both networks) than any positive access mark-up. Yet, it does not follow that both networks will agree to subsidizing access, since a large enough access markup may instead allow the incumbent operator to corner the market, and higher levels might moreover allow the incumbent operator to earn the full monopoly pro…t. Another key …nding is that limiting entry without deterring it entirely is never pro…table. This 13 Since on-net pricing generates club e¤ects, consumers face coordination problems and there may exist multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices. We will refer to "customer inertia" when, in case of multiple responses, consumers adopt the response that is most favourable to the incumbent. 14 We will refer to "customer activism" when, by contrast to the case of customer inertia, in case of multiple responses consumers adopt the response that is most favourable to the entrant. result has clear implications for policy. Finally, we show that termination-based price discrimination is a key factor in foreclosing competition. Indeed, absent on-net pricing, foreclosure strategies are never pro…table -and moreover no longer feasible in a receiverpays regime.
There are only few insights from the academic literature on the impact of mobile operators'termination rates on entry or predation. Calzada and Valletti (2008) extend Gans and King's analysis to a (symmetric) multi-…rm industry; they stress that incumbent operators may favour above-cost termination charges when new operators face entry costs:
for any given number of …rms, increasing the charge above cost decreases the equilibrium pro…ts but, by the same token, limits the number of entrants; overall, this allows incumbent operators to increase their own pro…ts. This however requires incumbent operators to commit not to modify the termination charge if entry occurs; otherwise, entrants would anticipate that incumbent operators have incentives to decrease the termination charge once entry occurs, and an above-cost termination charge no longer deters entry. In our model, we allow instead the entrant to remain "in the market" even if it is not active; thus, our foreclosure results do not depend on such commitment assumption. Hoernig (2007) analyzes predatory pricing in the presence of call externalities (i.e., taking into account the utility of receiving calls) and termination-based price discrimination, for given termination charges. He shows that call externalities give the incumbent operator an incentive to increase its o¤-net price in order to make a smaller rival less attractive (as it will receive fewer or shorter calls), and this incentive is even higher when the incumbent operator engages in predatory pricing and seeks to reduce its rival's pro…t. Calzada and Valletti (2008) , and Hoernig (2007) thus study how incumbent operators can reduce rivals'pro…tability in order to limit entry, at the expense of a (possibly temporary) loss in their own pro…t. In contrast, we study how the incumbent operator can manipulate the termination charge (even when it is reciprocal) to increase its own pro…t at the expense of the entrant.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses retail competition for a given, reciprocal, access charge. It …rst characterizes shared-market equilibria and extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks; it then studies under what conditions one network may corner the market. Section 4 draws the implications for the determination of the access charge and shows that, despite Gans and King's insight, an incumbent network may favour a high access charge in order to foreclose the market. Section 5 analyses the case of no termination-based price discrimination under both the caller-pays and the receiver-pays regime. Section 6 concludes.
The model
There are two networks: an incumbent, I, and an entrant, E. Both networks have the same cost structure. It costs f to connect a customer, and each call costs c c O + c T , where c O and c T respectively denote the costs borne by the originating and terminating networks. To terminate an o¤-net call, the originating network must pay a reciprocal access charge a to the terminating network. The access mark-up is thus equal to: m a c T .
Networks o¤er substitutable services but are di¤erentiated à la Hotelling. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1], whereas the two networks are located at the two ends of this segment. Consumers'tastes are represented by their position on the segment and taken into account through a "transportation" cost t > 0, which re ‡ects their disutility from not enjoying their ideal type of service. For a given volume of calls q, a consumer located at x and joining network i = I; E located at x i 2 f0; 1g obtains a gross utility given by:
where u(q) denotes the variable gross surplus, with u 0 > 0 > u 00 and u 0 (0) < +1.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that u (0), the …xed surplus derived from being connected to either network, is large enough to ensure full participation. 15 Finally, we assume that consumers switching to E's network incur a cost s > 0.
Each network i = I; E o¤ers a three-part tari¤:
where F i is the …xed subscription fee and p i andp i respectively denote the on-net and o¤-net usage prices:
Let i denote network i's market share. Assuming a balanced calling pattern, 16 the net surplus o¤ered by network i is (for i 6 = j = I; E):
where
denotes the consumer surplus for a price p.
In a …rst step, we will take as given the reciprocal termination charge and study the subsequent competition game where the networks set simultaneously their retail tari¤s (subscription fees and usage prices), and then consumers choose which network to subscribe to and how much to call. In a second step we discuss the determination of the termination charge. Before that, we characterize the consumer response to networks' prices and provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium prices.
Marginal cost pricing. As usual, networks …nd it optimal to adopt cost-based usage prices. Network i's pro…t is equal to:
Adjusting F i so as to maintain net surpluses w I and w E and thus market shares constant, 17 services or the ability of receiving calls, which are not explicitly modeled here. See also the discussion in footnotes (21) and (30). 16 This assumption implies that the proportion of calls originating on a given network and completed on the same or the other network re ‡ects networks'market shares. 17 As already noted, on-net pricing can generate multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices.
then leads network i to set its prices p i andp i so as to maximize
which yields marginal-cost pricing:
Thus, both networks always charge usage prices that re ‡ect the perceived cost of calls:
the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the access mark-up m for o¤-net calls. As a result, while each network i must pay i j mq(p i ) to its rival, there is no net interconnection payment; since both networks charge the same o¤-net price
neither the incumbent nor the entrant has a net out ‡ow of calls:
whatever the networks'market shares.
Network Externalities and market shares. Since the o¤-net price, c + m , increases with the access mark-up, departing from cost-based termination charges generates tari¤-mediated network externalities. For example, if the access mark-up is positive, prices are higher for o¤-net calls (c + m > c) and the subscribers of a given network are thus better o¤, the more customers join that network. As a result, there may exist multiple consumer responses to given subscription fees F I and F E .
If consumers anticipate market shares I and E = 1 I , then they expect a net surplus
from subscribing to network i, for i 6 = j = I; E. A consumer located at a distance x 2 [0; 1] from network I is therefore willing to stay with that network when w I tx w E t(1 x) s and prefers to switch otherwise. In a shared-market outcome, the actual
We assume here that changing tari¤s so as to keep net surpluses constant does not trigger consumers to switch to alternative responses, if they exist.
consumer response,^ i , as a function of consumers'expectation i , is therefore given bŷ
where I 1; E 1, and 1=2t measures the substitutability between the two networks. Note that the function^ i has a constant slope, equal to
summarize the balance between product di¤erentiation, measured by t, and the network externalities stemming from on-net pricing, measured by v (c) v (c + m).
We will assume that, having observed the prices, consumers have self-ful…lling expectations, implying that market shares constitute a …xed point of the "reaction to anticipations", max f0; min f1;^ (:)gg). 18 When m is small, the relative preferences over the two networks prevail:
in which case the slope d^ i =d i is lower than 1 (and is even negative for m < 0, as network externalities then yield a bonus for the smaller network), implying that there exists a unique consumer response to any given …xed fees (see Figure 1) . The …xed point
is characterized by
determines the networks' market shares I and E when it lies in (0; 1) ( Figure 1 .A).
When instead it exceeds 1 (so that^ i (1) 1), network i corners the market ( Figure   1 .B); …nally, when it is negative (so that^ i (0) 0), the other network corners the market (Figure 1 .C). As m increases, o¤-net calls become more expensive, which generates greater network externalities in favor of the larger network; as a result, (m) decreases and may even become negative for m large enough. There may then exist multiple consumer responses, as illustrated in Figure 2 .A, where two cornered-market outcomes co-exist with a sharedmarket one: o¤-net calls being much more expensive than on-net calls, customers prefer to join the larger network, regardless of its other characteristics; the network externalities from on-net pricing prevail over the relative preferences for the two operators, and either network can then corner the market.
The shared-market outcome is moreover unstable: a small increase in the market share of any network triggers a cumulative process in favour of that network, and this process converges towards that network cornering the market. 19 In contrast, the two cornered-market outcomes are stable. In particular, starting from a situation where all consumers are with the incumbent, a few customers making a "mistake" and switching to the entrant would not trigger any snowballing in favour of the entrant; the customers would thus regret their mistake and wish to have stayed with the incumbent. Since customer inertia may favour the incumbent, in the case of multiple consumer responses it may be reasonable to assume that the stable outcome where consumers stick to the incumbent network is the most plausible outcome. Yet, throughout the paper, we will also take into consideration the possibility of alternative consumer responses and study under what conditions the incumbent can make sure to keep the rival out of the market.
Price competition
We now characterize the equilibrium …xed fees, given the consumer response determined in the previous section.
Shared-market equilibria
In the light of the above analysis, a price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market outcome can exist only when (5) holds, in which case the consumer response is moreover always unique. We denote by i (F I ; F E ) the corresponding market share of network i = I; E. Since usage prices re ‡ect costs, network i's pro…t can be written as (for i 6 = j = I; E):
Best responses. Given the rival's fee F j , we can use the market share de…nition (6) to express F i and i as a function of i :
and I = E = 1. The …rst-order derivative is
while the second-order derivative is negative if and only if:
When this second-order condition holds, we have: 
that is, network i's best response is given by (middle zone in Figure 3 ):
where the denominator is positive as long as the second-order condition holds.
Equilibrium. Solving for the …rst-order conditions yields:
Substituting (12) into (6), equilibrium market shares are given by
It is easy to check that (m) > 0 in any candidate shared-market equilibrium, 20 which implies that the market share I exceeds 1=2 and increases with s. Therefore, it corresponds indeed to a shared-market equilibrium (i.e., i < 1) when and only when s is small enough, namely, when
20 When subscription fees are (weak) strategic complements ( 
When m 0, (5) implies ( and (m) + mq(c + m) < 0, subscription fees are strategic substitutes. However, the shared-market condition (14) then implies (10) and @F i =@F j > 1; therefore, the price equilibrium is again unique and stable, as illustrated by Figure 3 .B, and involves again a shared market characterized by (12) . In all cases, (5) moreover implies that consumer responses to prices yield a stable market outcome. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 A stable price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market outcome exists, in which case it is the unique price equilibrium, if and only if (5) and (14) hold.
Proposition 1 shows that a stable shared-market equilibrium exists when either the termination charge or the substitutability of the two networks is not too high (condition (5)), and switching costs are moreover moderate (condition (14)). For example, for costbased access charges (m = 0), such an equilibrium exists when s < 3t. 21 When this 21 As mentioned earlier, the utility derived from being connected to either network is suppose to be condition is satis…ed, a shared-market equilibrium also exists (and is then the unique equilibrium) when the termination mark-up is positive, as long as (5) and (14) remain satis…ed.
Comparative statics. We now study the impact of the access charge on sharedmarket equilibrium pro…ts. Gans and King (2001) show that symmetric networks prefer access charges below marginal costs. Intuitively, when m is positive, o¤-net calls are priced above on-net calls, so consumers prefer to join larger networks, all else being equal. Consequently, networks bid more aggressively for marginal customers. Networks prefer instead to soften competition by setting the access charge below cost. The next proposition con…rms that, as long as the two networks share the market, price competition is softened when m decreases below zero, independently of networks'sizes.
Proposition 2 In the range of termination charges yielding a shared-market equilibrium:
(i) both networks'equilibrium pro…ts are higher for a cost-based termination charge (m = 0) than for any positive termination mark-up (m > 0);
(ii) there exists a termination subsidy (m < 0) that gives both networks even greater pro…ts.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks. It however only applies to termination markups that are small enough to yield a shared-market equilibrium. As we will see, networks may actually favour more extreme termination markups that allow them to corner the market and charge high prices. 22 large enough to ensure full participation. Under cost-based access charges, the marginal consumer'net utility is equal to:
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for full participation is v (c) > f + 3t, since then the marginal consumer obtains a positive net utility whenever a shared-market equilibrium exists, i.e., whenever s < 3t. 22 The same comment applies to the case of symmetric operators considered by Gans and King (which corresponds here to s = 0). While they show that networks' symmetric shared-market equilibrium pro…ts are maximal for a negative mark-up, more extreme mark-ups (including positive ones) may induce cornered-market equilibria that generate greater industry pro…ts.
We now study under what conditions a network operator can corner the market.
Suppose …rst that (5) still holds, ensuring that there is a unique consumer response to subscription fees. From the above analysis, a cornered-market equilibrium can then exist only when condition (14) fails to hold.
In a candidate equilibrium where network i corners the market, the consumers located at the other end of the segment must prefer to stick to i's network; that is, for i 6 = j = I; E:
inequality holds strictly then i can increase its subscription fee and still corner the market.
Therefore, a necessary equilibrium condition is:
In addition: (i) network i should not prefer to charge a higher fee and increase its margin at the expense of its market share; and (ii) its rival should not be able to attract consumers and make positive pro…ts. The precise interpretation of these two conditions depends on the concavity of the pro…t functions.
Concave pro…ts. When (10) also holds, each operator's pro…t is globally concave with respect to its own price; the relevant deviations thus involve marginal price changes leading to a shared-market outcome. A candidate equilibrium satisfying (15) is therefore indeed an equilibrium if and only if:
Network i does not gain from a marginal increase in its fee; 23 given the previous analysis of best responses, this amounts to
4( (m) + mq(c + m)=2), or:
The rival network j does not gain from a marginal reduction in its fee or, equivalently, cannot make a positive pro…t by attracting its closest consumers; this amounts to:
Network j's fee must therefore lie in the range
which is feasible only when
For the incumbent (i = I, for which I = 1), this condition is satis…ed whenever (14) fails to hold. Any pair of subscription fees (F I ; F E ) satisfying
and
then constitutes a price equilibrium where I corners the market. Among those equilibria, only one does not rely on weakly dominated strategies for E, and is therefore tremblinghand perfect: this is the one where
By contrast, E can corner the market only if
It follows that E cannot corner the market if m 0 (since the left-hand side is then
positive under (5)); however, the left-hand side may become negative and possibly lower than s=3 when m is largely negative, in which case there can be a continuum of equilibria in which E corners the market by charging
including a unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium where I sets F I = f mq (c + m) and E thus charges
Note …nally that, since (19) is more demanding for E than for I, I can corner the market whenever E can do so (that is, both cornered market equilibria exist whenever E can corner the market). 24 Figure 4 illustrates this case.
Convex pro…ts. When (10) fails to hold, each operator's pro…t is convex with respect 24 As usual with network e¤ects, di¤erent expectations yield multiple consumer responses, which in turn may sustain multiple equilibria. The network e¤ect arises here from on-net pricing rather than traditional club e¤ects. In a di¤erent context, Matutes and Vives (1996) show that di¤erent expectations about the success of banks and coordination problems among depositors can result in multiple sharedand cornered-market equilibria (and even in a no-banking equilibrium).
to its own subscription fee. The relevant strategies then consist in either cornering the market or leaving it to the rival. Thus, in a candidate equilibrium where I corners the market, it must be the case that:
I does not gain from "opting out", i.e., it should obtain a non-negative pro…t:
E does not gain from lowering its subscription fee so as to corner the market, i.e., from charging F E satisfying (24): It follows that I's equilibrium price must satisfy:
f+t (m)+s f f f+t (m)-s F I (F E ) F E (F
where the left-hand side is indeed always higher than the right-hand side under (5). Any combination of fees satisfying (20) and (25) constitutes an equilibrium in which I corners the market.
We can similarly study under what conditions E can corner the market: condition (24) must hold, E must obtain a non-negative pro…t (i.e., F E f ) and I should not be able to make a pro…t by cornering the market, i.e.:
this equilibrium E's equilibrium fee satis…es: when
there is a unique consumer response, in which I corners the market (b i (0) > 0, Figure 2 .B);
when instead
there are two stable consumer responses, in which either I or E corners the market Figure 2 .A); 25 …nally, when
there is again a unique consumer response, in which E corners the market (b i (1) < 1, Figure 2 
.C).
Obviously, a network can corner the market more easily when consumers favour that network in case of multiple responses to prices.
Suppose …rst that customer inertia, say, systematically favours the incumbent in the "middle" case corresponding to (27). Then I wins the whole market as long as F I F E s (m), otherwise E wins the market. Since s (m) > 0, I bene…ts from a competitive advantage in this Bertrand competition for the market and therefore corners the market in equilibrium. Moreover, ignoring weakly dominated strategies for E, the equilibrium is unique and such that F E = f and F I = f + s (m), giving I a positive pro…t,
, which moreover increases with m.
26
Suppose now that customer activism, say, is instead favourable to the entrant, i.e., consumers stick to E in case of multiple consumer responses. Then I wins the market only when F I F E s + (m); therefore:
When the switching cost is large enough, namely
then I still enjoys a competitive advantage and corners again the market in equilibrium; ignoring weakly dominated strategies, in equilibrium E sells at cost (F E = f ) and I obtains a pro…t, I = s + (m) (< s), which decreases with m.
When instead the switching cost is low (s < (m)), the tari¤-mediated network externalities dominate and customer activism gives a competitive advantage to E; as a result, in all equilibria E corners the market.
27
Recap. The above analysis can be summarized as follows. When m = 0, conditions (5) and (10) hold; therefore, from the above analysis, E cannot corner the market (this would require s < 3t, a contradiction), whereas I can corner the market only if the switching cost is prohibitively high, namely: s 3t. When the switching cost is not that high, I may still corner the market when the termination charge departs from cost;
however, E may then also corner the market. More precisely:
Proposition 3 Cornered-market equilibria exist in the following circumstances:
Unique consumer response ( (m) > 0):
-Concave pro…ts (' (m) > 0): there exists an equilibrium in which I corners the market when (m) s=3; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners the market when (m) s=3.
-Convex pro…ts (' (m) 0): there always exists an equilibrium in which I corners the market; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners the market when (m) s.
Multiple consumer responses ( (m) 0):
-Customer inertia favourable to the incumbent: there exists a unique equilibrium, in which I corners the market.
-Customer activism favourable to the entrant: there generically exists a unique equilibrium; in this equilibrium, I corners the market when (m) > s, whereas E corners the market when (m) < s.
Strategic choice of the access charge
Under a cost-based termination charge (m = 0), consumer response to prices is always unique and operators' pro…ts are moreover concave (since ' (0) = (0) = t > 0). Yet, even in that case, E cannot obtain a positive market share if switching costs are too large -namely, if (0) = t s=3. In what follows, we thus assume that s < 3t, and study I's strategic incentive to depart from cost-based termination charges in order to foreclose the market and increase its pro…t. in which case I corners the market and obtains
which increases with m as long as demand remains positive (that is, m < m):
Foreclosing the market in this way is pro…table for I when the maximum pro…t that it can obtain, C I C I ( m) = s t + , exceeds the pro…t that it could obtain by sharing the market for m = 0, which is equal to
This amounts to s > s 2 p 1 + 2 =t 3t (> 3 (t )).
We thus have:
for s s, it is never pro…table for the incumbent to foreclose the market by raising the termination charge above cost; for s > s, 29 the combination of network externalities and switching costs makes it instead pro…table for I to foreclose the market in this way.
Case 2 (large network externalities): > t. Increasing the termination charge abovem 1 (0) then ensures that consumers always prefer to be all on the same network ( (m) < 0); the pro…tability of this foreclosure strategy however depends critically on which network is more likely to win the market when there are multiple consumer responses. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on two polar cases, where either customer inertia systematically favours the incumbent, or customer activism systematically favours the entrant.
Customer inertia. When I bene…ts from customer inertia, it can keep E out and better exploit its market power by raising further the termination charge abovem; I still wins the market and can charge up to (the superscript CI standing for "customer 29 This amounts to
, where the right-hand side lies above
' 63% as long as < t; I should thus keep at least about two-thirds of the market under cost-based termination charges. the subscription fee to extract the full value from the farthest consumer:
Setting the termination charge above m M , such that F
would then allow I to achieve the monopoly pro…t. Customer inertia can thus be interpreted as a "virtual" switching cost, which can allow the incumbent to corner the market and earn the monopoly pro…t even in the absence of any real switching costs. 
Hence there may exist cases in which "bill and keep" allows the incumbent to deter entry. Nevertheless, foreclosing the market therefore requires subsidies that are large enough to make pro…ts convex (i.e., to ensure ' (m) 0), which may be di¢ cult to achieve:
First, ' may remain positive: starting from m = 0, introducing a small subsidy in-
may become positive for larger subsidies, there is no guarantee that this happens, and even in that case, there is no guarantee that ' may become negative for large enough subsidies.
Second, the size of subsidies may be limited by feasibility considerations; even "bill and keep" -i.e., m = c T -may not su¢ ce to generate a large enough subsidy.
Third, very large subsidies and convex pro…ts may allow the entrant, too, to corner the market; to avoid this, the incumbent should choose a termination charge satisfying (m) < s, which, since 0 (m) < 0 for m < 0, imposes an additional restriction on the size of the subsidy (in particular, this restriction may be incompatible with
Finally, subsidizing termination may generate abuses and, moreover, o¤ering lower prices for o¤-net calls may not …t well with marketing strategies.
Despite these di¢ culties, large subsidies may in some cases allow the incumbent to corner the market and increase its pro…t. For example, if ' (m) < 0 for the termination subsidy such that (m) = s, then adopting this subsidy (or a slightly lower one) ensures that I corners the market and obtains a pro…t equal to s + (m) = 2s, which is twice the maximal pro…t that I can obtain by foreclosing the market through a positive termination mark-up when customer activism bene…ts the entrant.
Recap
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 4 Suppose that s < 3t, so that cost-oriented access pricing would allow the entrant to share the market. While both networks would favour a small reduction in the access charge over a small increase in the access charge, the incumbent might increase its pro…t by departing further away from cost-based access pricing in order to corner the market; assuming that network externalities are large enough (namely, > t):
If the incumbent bene…ts from customer inertia in case of multiple consumer responses, then it would have an incentive to increase the access charge as much as possible and could earn in this way up to the monopoly pro…t.
If instead the entrant bene…ts from customer activism, then by foreclosing the market through a positive termination mark-up, the incumbent can earn a pro…t at most equal to s, which it can achieve by adopting m =m, such that (m) = 0.
The incumbent may also bene…t from foreclosing the market through a large enough termination subsidy, although feasibility, strategic (equilibrium multiplicity) and marketing considerations tend to limit this possibility. that the incumbent can achieve by cornering the market through large access markups. To complete the welfare analysis we also study the impact of the access charge on consumer surplus (CS), net of …xed fees and switching and transport costs: 32 By contrast, E cannot corner the market in the absence of customer activism, since (5) here implies (14) . with m =m is now higher than in any shared-market equilibrium (even with "bill and keep"), however. Therefore, even in case of customer activism, I will here prefer to corner the market with a large enough access mark-up (namely,m) rather than sharing the market with lower or below-cost access charges.
Consumer surplus. In both cases (for small and large switching costs), consumer surplus increases with m as long as the networks share the market. The reason is that competition is more aggressive for higher access charges. Also, in both cases, the incumbent corners the market when m m and consumer surplus then decreases (respectively increases) with m in the presence of customer inertia (activism), since a higher m, reduces (increases) the competitive pressure of the entrant. Finally, in the case of large switching costs, the incumbent also corners the market when m lies between m andm, and in this range increasing the access charge reduces the competitive pressure, allows the incumbent to charge a higher …xed fee and thus results in lower consumer surplus.
No termination-based price discrimination
So far we have considered the case of termination-based price discrimination. This section, in contrast, assumes that networks cannot charge di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls. We will …rst examine whether the incumbent can deter entry under the caller-pays regime. Then, we will explore the case of the receiver-pays regime.
Caller-pays regime
In this section we examine whether the incumbent can foreclose competition through access charges when there is no termination-based price discrimination. Network i's pro…t is then (for i 6 = j = I; E):
A detailed analysis of shared-market equilibria can be found in Carter and Wright (2003) and López (2008) . Market shares are given by:
where w i = v (p i ) F i denotes the net surplus that operator i o¤ers its customers. We can interpret network i's strategy as o¤ering a price p i and a net surplus w i and, given network j's strategy, network i's best response moreover entails
Therefore, given network j's strategy, we can write network i's pro…t as
For m = 0,~ 00 i (w i ) = 2 < 0 and second-order conditions therefore hold; …rst-order conditions yield p I = p E = c and
so a shared-market equilibrium exists provided that s < 3t, in which case the incumbent's pro…t is equal to
We also know from the previous papers that any small departure from m = 0 lowers the incumbent's pro…t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which I corners the market. In the light of the above analysis, it follows that p I = c and p E = c + m. For this to be an equilibrium, even the consumers closest to E must prefer to stay with I, that is, v(c) t F I v(c + m) s F E ; and since I maximizes its pro…t, this inequality cannot be strict, therefore:
Moreover, I should not gain from a marginal increase in its fee:
that is:
In addition, E should not make any pro…t by stealing a few customers, that is:
Using (31), we can rewrite conditions (32) and (33) as:
Any F E in the above range can support a cornered-market equilibrium if second-order conditions are moreover satis…ed; eliminating weakly dominated strategies singles out the equilibrium in which F E = f mq(c), < 0. Since (3t) = 0 and 0 (s) > 0 (when s < 3t), it follows that (s) < 0 for s < 3t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which E corners the market, then p I = c + m
and p E = c. Moreover, the pair of prices (F I ; F E ) must satisfy
In addition, I should not make any pro…t by attracting a few customers, i.e.,
But combining those two conditions yields
where the right-hand side is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to s t < 0. Therefore, in the absence of termination-based price discrimination the entrant cannot corner the market. 
Receiver-pays regime
Moreover, López (2011) shows that when setting usage prices at the o¤-net cost, i's pro…t writes as^ i = i (F i ; F j )[F i f ], which does not depend on m. In other words, m a¤ects the usage prices but it does not a¤ect the competition in …xed fees. As a result the access charge has not impact on the equilibrium pro…t. Therefore, in the absence of termination-based price discrimination, networks cannot use access charges to soften or foreclose competition when they charge for incoming calls.
33 López (2011) generalizes the framework of Jeon, La¤ont and Tirole (2004) by allowing a random noise in both the callers'and receivers'utilities, by removing the assumption of a given proportionality between the utility functions and by allowing asymmetry between …rms with respect to the installed market shares.
34 López (2011) show that this equilibrium exists and is unique even if the random noise of the utilities does not vanish, and thereby receivers can hang up. Cambini and Valletti (2008) , and Jeon, La¤ont and Tirole (2004) , however, consider the case of vanishing noise, where the caller determines the volume of calls 'most of the time'.
We have studied the impact of reciprocal access charges on entry when consumers face switching costs, and networks compete in three-part tari¤s, charging possibly di¤erent prices for o¤-net calls. The analysis shows that when the incumbent bene…ts from customer inertia, it has an incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access mark-up, so as to foreclose the market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power; a large termination subsidy could also achieve the same outcome, although subsidies may in practice be limited by feasibility constraints and moreover trigger various types of arbitrage.
The scope for foreclosure is more limited if the entrant bene…ts instead from customer activism; while the incumbent can still wish to manipulate the termination charge in order to prevent entry, too high access charges might then allow the entrant to overtake the incumbent. As a result, optimal foreclosure strategies rely either on limited access markups or on access subsidies, and are pro…table only when consumers'switching costs are large enough.
Irrespective of whether customers tend to favour the incumbent or the entrant in case of multiple potential responses to networks' prices, foreclosure strategies are pro…table here only when they result in complete entry deterrence: while the incumbent can increase its market share by insisting on above-cost reciprocal charges, this also results in more intense price competition and, as a result, both operators'equilibrium pro…ts are lower than when the reciprocal access charges are at or below cost. In other words, limiting entry without deterring it entirely is never pro…table. This result has clear policy implications.
Finally, the network e¤ects created by termination-based price discrimination appear to be a key ingredient for pro…table foreclosure strategies. Indeed, in the absence of on-net pricing, neither the incumbent nor the entrant …nd it pro…table to manipulate the access charge so as to foreclose competition. In addition, in a receiver-pays regime, neither operator can use the access charge to foreclose competition.
Further research can extend the analysis in at least two directions. First, in our model there is only one incumbent and one entrant. As we usually observe tight oligopolies, our analysis could be extended to allow for an incumbent (possibly symmetric) oligopoly …ghting the arrival of a new entrant. Second, it would be interesting to allow for the arrival of new customers who are not attached to the incumbent network. In this context, the incumbent network may …nd it pro…table to set the access charge so as to keep cornering its customer base while sharing the segment of new consumers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (8) and (12), network i's pro…t can be written as
where ' (m) > 0 (from (10)). Replacing (13) into this expression yields
For the sake of exposition, we will assume that q (c + m) remains positive; it is easy to extend to the case q (c + m) 0. 
